by all UN Member States, and therefore, has the capacity to fundamentally transform gender relations and women's rights in the context of how the world defines and practices international security (Cohn 2004) .
Starting with the Beijing Platform for Action in 1995, the WPS 1 resolutions are a product of two decades of advocacy centered on women's right to participate in peace processes and women's rights for special protection during and after conflict. These fundamental challenges regarding the exclusion of women and sexual and gender-based violence are not new issues for women or human rights activists (Bunch 1990 ) and have certainly been part of the global women's movement long before the 1990s (Enloe 1989) . What is novel and demanding analysis, however, is the practice of framing these women's rights issues as matters of international peace and security. SCR 1325 directly applies a security framework for understanding, justifying, and addressing women's rights; this framework operates from the premise that women's rights and gender equality situated in a human rights frame or even a moral frame is not enough and simply ineffective in generating awareness, response, and commitment. Therefore, the framework highlights how protecting and promoting the rights of women is a fundamental component of establishing peace and security-the central mission of the UN, particularly the Security Council. The security language serves as a framework for action through discursive positioning that situates women as central to, or at least part of, the security agenda. Such a strategic approach highlights how women's rights and gender equality can contribute to international peace and security, and therefore constitute vested interest for many national and international leaders. As Sanam Anderlini (2000, 3) argues, it is not a matter of what women stand to gain from inclusion into the peace process, but rather "what peace processes stand to lose when women's wealth of experiences, creativity, and knowledge are excluded."
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the effect of this security discourse on the human rights of women in conflict-affected countries. Like any strategic discourse, one must look at the power and politics behind the approach, critically examining the assumed achievements and often missed opportunities. While many have criticized the UN in its implementation of the WPS agenda for lacking political will, adequate funding, and any statelevel accountability Binder et. al. 2008; Raven-Roberts 2005; Whitworth 2004 ), many scholars and activists maintain that SCR 1325 has made a difference as "an expression of a new norm in the making" (Tryggestad 2009 ). More specifically, it has led to rhetorical, legal, and procedural shifts that broaden the global security agenda to include women, women's concerns, and even gender in new and important ways (Hudson 2009a (Hudson , 2009b . Now, fifteen years after the adoption of SCR 1325, it is important to reassess the impact of the security framework for empowering women in conflict zones around the world.
To best understand the dynamic impact of the WPS agenda, this paper utilizes Mary K.
Meyer and Elisabeth's Prügl's 1999 three-prong theoretical approach for understanding the particular meaning that women and gender have in the context of human rights advocacy and global governance. From contesting language to locating women and shaping national and international political agendas, the three approaches not only highlight the dynamic character of the field, but various ways that women's networks mainstream, engage, and otherwise operate in global spaces. While SCR 1325 reaffirms some of the original insight of this scholarship, it also illustrates some significant shifts in the relationship between feminist activism and global governance structures, particularly in the area of security and human rights governance. As the findings below indicate, innovative interaction between UN senior leadership, WPS activists, and local women leaders have led to a process that is more personal, more transparent, more democratic and in some ways more effective. At the same time, the case of SCR 1325 and the WPS agenda highlights some unique challenges that have emerged for those advocating for an approach to international peace and security that takes women's rights and gender equality in politics seriously.
This paper begins with a closer look at how the WPS agenda has challenged the prevailing discourse at the UN, especially within the Security Council. Inserting women's rights and gender equality into discussions about international peace and security not only contest language and meanings of security but also reflect critical rhetorical shifts in the work of multilateral institutions, like the UN. The paper then focuses on the particular ways the WPS agenda locates women in armed conflict, conflict resolution, and peace processes and how such recognition of women in these circumstances can lead to enhanced opportunity for more resources, new partnerships, and improved procedures for women's rights and gender equality.
Lastly, the paper considers the ways in which the WPS resolutions and the advocacy surrounding their passage shapes and reshapes international and national security agendas. Such agendasetting can have important normative, legal, and policy implications. In this way, the chapter builds on previous research (Hudson 2009a (Hudson , 2009b regarding the securitization of women's rights by incorporating Meyer and Prügl's three-prong approach and updated empirical findings as 1325 marks its fifteen-year anniversary.
Contesting Language: Changing the Way Women (and Security) are Talked about
Possibly one of the greatest achievements of SCR 1325 has been changing the discourse in global governance circles to frame gender equality and women's rights as issues relevant, if not central to, issues of international peace and security. This has meant not only recognition of women's unique security needs during and after conflict, but acceptance of the notion that women's security is essential to the fundamental goal of the Security Council-the promotion and protection of international peace and security. To be sure, this linguistic convention relies on an instrumental argument that frames women's protection and participation as a resource to be tapped into and utilized to improve the overall outcome of the existing mission. And although this argument rests on exploitative and subordinate undertones, the majority of the local women leaders from conflict-affected areas that I have interviewed over the last decade not only identify themselves as the peacemakers (a priori) of their communities, but they want whatever argument is going to allow them to get their foot in the door. As Carol Cohn also reports, "I am told by some women 'on the ground' that they could not care less what argument gets them in-just get the damn door cracked open before we all perish" (2008, 201) .
Still, despite this instrumentality, the text of SCR 1325 makes women's lives relevant to the work of the Council. The document recognizes women as both agents with rights to participate at all levels and all phases of decision-making as well as victims of armed conflict in need of special protection. The former representation of women is quite radical especially in global security governance circles. The latter is less so and, somewhat expectedly, the area where there has been the most movement over the last decade.
In 2008, the SC passed its second resolution, 1820, focused on women as victims of sexual violence and in need of special protection. This was quickly followed by two more This language, in addition to a number of accountability mechanisms also outlined in SCR 1889, moves the WPS governance agenda forward by putting structural inequality and specific rights issues on the Council's agenda while also returning to the broad goals originally set in SCR 1325
in terms of women's participation. As Dianne Otto concludes, "while the two recent resolutions still leave much to be desired from a feminist point of view, they nevertheless suggest that it is possible to strengthen the progressive content of feminist ideas, once they have a foothold in institutional discourse, even following some weakening of those footholds" (2010, 112) . This building process, even if slow and nonlinear, is significant in the way ideas become institutionalized with the ongoing development of global governance structures. Nothing about these socially constructed norms and agreed-upon language is permanent or guaranteed; thus, it is critical that advocates establish accountability mechanisms, even if done in a piecemeal way.
Over time, these achievements build on one another and create a web of governance structures that eventually lead to a WPS architecture.
There are now a total of seven resolutions on WPS with the two most recent being on women in conflict prevention, conflict, and post-conflict, which essentially "adds to the soft law on the human rights of women, and shows a willingness to expand into an area of activity where there is no clear provision in the text of the treaty, and where the Security Council has been active for the last 13 years" (Rimmer 2013, 1) . More specifically, the Committee seeks to use its power to oversee state periodic reporting to achieve compliance with the WPS agenda, to encourage the allocation of adequate budgets for WPS policy-making, and to impart broad interpretations of the meaning of gender equality, particularly the meaning of conflict-related gender-based violence. These most recent documents represent an important rhetorical (re)focus on a broad gender equality agenda as well as a significant building of accountability in UN practices and procedures. As noted in previous research, this connection between the work of the CEDAW committee and WPS advocates was absent until 2006 when CEDAW's session report began to make systematic reference to the integration of SCR 1325 in the compliance of State parties to the Convention (Hudson 2009a (Hudson , 2009b .
It is important to note that these rhetorical shifts and achievements in the security discourse are not just semantics for women on the ground. One interviewee summarized the significance of the discourse:
You engage, you discuss, you argue, you advocate, whatever. Then you have a product that allows, that gives the policy weight, that raises the concerns and issues and then you have the potential to move the system…You have to start by getting the language. You get the mandate and that leads to policy -crystallizes in a document…Acceptance of the language is key. That's were you begin to change perceptions and understandings.
( DPKO official, 2006) The issues outlined in SCR 1325 are essential to their survival, to their security. Irrespective of the framework used, establishing the language on this is a critical first step and progress has been made on this front. In terms of overall trends, the NGO Working Group on WPS finds that the Council has increasingly incorporated language on women and gender into country-specific resolutions over the past twelve years. Over 45 percent of monitored resolutions referenced women, gender, or SCR 1325 since the resolution was passed in October 2000, in contrast to the less than 5 percent of resolutions mentioning women, girls, or gender in the period between 1998-2000. 2 Despite this upward trend, the gains have been inconsistent from resolution to resolution and when dealing with country-situations there is no resolution that has addressed the WPS agenda comprehensively. These gaps and inconsistencies hold true for Council reports, missions, briefings and presidential statements (Taylor et. al. 2013 ).
UN peacekeeping mandates have a relatively better record with eleven of the fifteen (73 percent) UN peacekeeping mandates referenced the WPS agenda. All ten of the UN political and peacebuilding mission mandates referenced the women, peace and security agenda, and four of the six (67 percent) resolutions renewing missions managed by other entities contain reference to women, peace and security (Taylor et. al. 2013) . These numbers reflect a general upward trend of improvement since the passage of 1325 in 2000 (Hudson 2009a (Hudson , 2009b ways in which the women's activism has "worked to effect structures of global governance in which women can no longer be ignored" (Prügl and Meyer 1999, 16 ).
Locating Women: Creating Space and Seizing Political Opportunities
Long before women's activism in international peace and security arenas, women have "succeeded in finding or opening-if circumscribed-spaces for women inside multilateral institutions" (Prügl and Meyer 1999, 7) . From suffragist campaigns to international development circles to the human rights regime, internationalist women's activism has been catalytic, innovative, and persistent (Antrobus 2004 : Snyder 1995 Peters and Wolper 1995) . The peace and security arena seems to be next on this advocacy trajectory and possibly most- Member States through the use of transnational advocacy networks (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Hill et. al. 2003; Joachim 2007) , and continue to be powerful opportunities to exchange information and build political support from the local to the global. As Tryggestad (2009, 540) notes, the case of SCR 1325 and the NGO activism surrounding it provides a useful illustration of the way the "third UN" has come to "routinely engage with the first and the second UN and thereby influence UN thinking, policies, priorities, and actions" (Weiss et. al. 2009, 127) . This is a unique location for the social practice of human rights to occur as it creates affective opportunities for a range of actors to interact and form relationships.
This engagement by WPS activists with gendered states and their international organizations has not of course gone unchallenged by feminist scholars and activists (Whitworth 2004; Wibben 2011) . Feminists have long been critical of operating within circles of power as they too often have the ability to diffuse the radical and transformative agenda of the feminist projects in ways that often go unchallenged and even unnoticed. For many, feminist engagement with institutional power can be outright dangerous (Otto 2010) . Despite this valid critique, many have found a need for both outsiders and insiders in the social practice of human rights advocacy. Georgina Waylen's case study on gendering the global human rights regime found that "organized women 'outsiders' can play a key role but, on their own, cannot effect significant change" (2008, 274) . In this case, insiders were effective in pressing for gender concerns by forming alliances with other sympathetic insiders. She found insiders to be necessary but not sufficient agents for change with regard to women's rights and gender equality. With some select support from Member States, DPKO has also overseen the deployment of the first all-female police unit of peacekeepers, which were first sent to Liberia in 2007. Since then, all female-formed police units have been deployed to Haiti, East Timor, and South Sudan.
The establishment of these units is important both in terms of outcome and the process involved in their creation as they seek to empower local women and further institutionalize gender-based violence as legitimate and serious threats relevant to rebuilding security sectors in post-conflict societies. The justification for these all-female contingencies often relies on essentialist notions about women's more "peaceful nature" which makes many feminists (not UN bureaucrats) very uncomfortable. Thus, I was struck by comments from two different DPKO officials that recognized this problematic assumption and were uneasy with it as well. One official critically discussed whether or not these all-females units really challenged women's traditional gender roles in conflict zones. The other official commented on the need to systematically research the impact these units were having on the ground. Notably, both officials spoke of these units as just the "first step in really changing and reworking [DPKO] their agency's approach to establishing international security for all" (Interview 2010). These "insiders" seemed conscious of the compromises they were making in the short-term while looking toward more genuine change over the long term. In many ways, promoting women's rights through the security framework reinforces traditional-militarized-approaches to establishing peace and security, which raises serious questions about the lasting consequences for empowering and protecting women in conflict-affected countries.
Along similar lines, because of WPS advocacy, gender training is become a more standard procedure in peacekeeping missions, and trainers often introduce SCR 1325 in their inmission training programs as a useful entry point to establishing their mandate from the Security
Council to conduct such training (Lyytikäinen 2007,12) . It is worth noting that many of these training programs, both the classes and the on-line training modules begin with learning the distinction between sex and gender. This simple distinction is critical to moving forward any discussion about the gendered impacts of armed conflict, peacekeeping, and "post-conflict" reconstruction. In many cases, it is the first time that those working in these areas have ever even considered the difference between the two. At minimum, these attitudinal and procedural shifts within DPKO and elsewhere illustrate a move from an ad hoc consideration, at best, to a more systematic consideration of gender perspectives and the role of women in peace missions. Much of this change has occurred under the label of gender mainstreaming, which has become the institutional gender strategy currently employed to change aspects of global governance from security to development to economics and beyond. 7 Despite these gains, "doing" gender in the UN still defaults to locating women and focusing on improving the position of women, rather than on the broader social and cultural structures that affect gender equality (Olonisakin et. al. 2010 ).
Even this more straightforward focus on the position of women is problematic. As of In this way, WPS advocacy closely resembles the additive approach of Women in Development (WID), rather than a more radical departure that may challenge the entire concept of sending soldiers to be peacekeepers, for example. Thus, despite the potentially radical language and ideas driving SCR 1325, progress is largely in terms of inserting women into the process and adding women's concerns to the agenda. This, of course, can be interpreted as the starting point for women working in a field like international security, an arena that has historically excluded women. There is certainly some validity to the argument that by adding women and women's issues and therefore broadening the security agenda, they will eventually have transformative consequences. Focusing on women, as opposed to gender, is much "easier" because it is far less threatening to existing power structures and systems. However, in looking at places where dynamic women have been inserted particularly in the case of SCR 1325, their presence has challenged the status quo much more than most would expect. This, of course, depends on personality but the impact of individuals-even in a patriarchal system-should not be underestimated. This raises important questions about whether or not such an additive approach has a sustainable impact on women's lives on the ground. Does this security language assist in improving women's rights in conflict-affect areas? To shed some light on these questions, we now turn to the ways in which WPS advocacy impacts national and international agenda-setting and policy-making.
Shaping International Agendas: Mainstreaming the Normative Influence
In 1999, Meyer and Prügl's book examined both the mainstreaming and disengaging strategies utilized by the various waves of the women's movement during the twentieth century, differentiating between those working within institutional structures for change and those intentionally operating outside of such structures to better critique and offer alternative perspectives. While women's rights activists in the twenty-first century certainly operate at both ends of the spectrum (and everywhere in between), the case of SCR 1325 illustrates the emancipatory potential, albeit imperfect, of engaging the mainstream while maintaining close ties with local actors operating outside of the Ivory Tower.
During one trip to UN Headquarters in 2010, I was able to observe individual briefings that UNIFEM held with several women who were local leaders in conflict-affected countries.
These women came from Nepal, Sudan, and Burundi to address the Secretary-General and senior leaders from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), UN Development Program (UNDP), UN Women, and DPKO in what came to be the first Global Open Day. 8 During these briefings, the UNIFEM officials were focused on preparing these women to speak to the UN senior leadership in a situation facing serious time constraints, language barriers, and inexperience speaking in such public venues like the UN. What was remarkable during these briefings was the ability of UNIFEM officials to draw out the voice of these local leaders without imposing their own agenda. In other words, UNIFEM was able to encourage confidence and time-efficiency while still allowing these women to use their own words to express what security meant in their daily lives. UNIFEM encouraged these women to use concrete examples to better connect with those that would be in the room. While one may certainly argue that the process of selecting these three women in some ways reflects the agenda of UNIFEM, from my observations there was a genuine effort by UNIFEM to bring women's concerns to the UN senior leadership in the most raw and unbiased fashion possible. For many in senior roles at the UN (who are mostly white men), this Global Open Day experience was the first time they had spoken directly with the women "on-the-ground" (who are mostly women of color) that they so often proclaim to protect and empower. This direct contact was extremely powerful, in terms of broadening the perspectives of those in positions of power and in terms of empowering women leaders by allowing their voices to be heard and to help shape the international agenda for security governance.
This sort of innovative face-to-face contact in security circles has undoubtedly This link is not only resonating at the international level, but at the national and regional levels as well. (Hale 1989; Lotherington and Flemmen 1991; Baden and Goetz 1998) . What is unique to the WPS agenda is its ability to maintain a strong set of both insiders and outsiders that sometimes work together but often work separately when attempting to shape the international security agenda. The ability to frame and set the agenda is a powerful one and transition from conflict provides unique opportunity structures for women's empowerment (Carpenter 2007) .
Securitizing Women's Human Rights: Looking Ahead
United Nations SCR 1325 and the broader WPS agenda is an instructive case for exploring an alternative discourse-and the actors and arenas that go along with that discourse-aimed at protecting and promoting the rights of women in conflict-affected countries around the world.
Much of the progress and touted achievements reflects an additive and integrative approach to the international security agenda rather than more transformative and critical line of attack against the UN's militarized narrative to establishing security, promoting peace and ensuring basic human rights. Women's concerns and rights are not internalized or institutionalized by international security actors and the network of NGOs advocating for the WPS agenda continue to be driving force behind any achievements in contesting the language and narrow understanding of security, in locating women and recognizing their role in conflict and conflict resolution, and in shaping international and national policy agendas to more systematically implement the WPS mandate (Shepherd 2014 Despite these challenges, it is clear that women's rights must continue to be inserted into international security circles, like the UN Security Council. It is another avenue for advocacy and a critical one for women's empowerment as so many countries begin to rebuild social, economic, and political structures and institutions after armed conflict. WPS advocacy efforts have successfully put women's rights and gender equality issues on the agenda of the Security Council among other international, regional and national security bodies. This discourse matters; language can influence attitudes, beliefs, and ultimately behavior.
This case also demonstrates that much more work is needed to understand the relationship between a rights-based approach and a security-based approach. This includes an indepth look at the conceptual links between human security and human rights. As one interviewee with over twenty years of UN experience told me, "the network of those involved in initiating the women, peace, and security movement-both NGOs and UN agencies-utilized a bandwagoning strategy by building their case upon the mainstream human rights movement" (UN official, 2006) , and this link requires further analysis.
Overall, the security framework does seem to have some positive impacts for women's rights activism. Through SCR 1325, the framework has served as an organizing and mobilizing force bringing women together, particularly for those suffering and working towards stability in war-torn regions of the world. It has allowed women to be the focus of Security Council debate for the first time in the seventy years since its inception. It has created new or improved upon existing strategic partnerships with donor countries, UN senior leadership, and the countless nongovernmental and grassroots organizations working to improve women's lives. In some cases, it has even created opportunities for resources and funding that might not have otherwise been available.
Despite these gains, one must proceed with caution. The security language has the potential to be limiting and exclusionary. The framework tends to ignore the bigger issues of militarism and coercion that continue to guide international interaction. And it can often rely upon essentialist assumptions about gender roles that can lead to justification of a return to an oppressive status quo. Feminists continue to be wary of the security language as a new and more politicized name for the already established human rights regime. In this sense, activists must ensure that the security language builds upon the accountability mechanisms, organizational capacity, and international norms that have long been evolving for international human rights.
SCR 1325 is a tool; it must be seen then as one of many means and not an end.
